Volume 115

Issue 2

Article 9

December 2012

Polley v. Ratcliff: A New Way to Address an Original Sin?
Atiba R. Ellis
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Atiba R. Ellis, Polley v. Ratcliff: A New Way to Address an Original Sin?, 115 W. Va. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/9

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Ellis: <em>Polley v. Ratcliff</em>: A New Way to Address an Original Sin

POLLEY V. RATCLIFF: A NEW WAY TO ADDRESS AN
ORIGINAL SIN?
A tiba R. Ellis*

I.
II.

.......................
INTRODUCTION.............
.................
POLLEY V. RATCLIFF: THEN AND Now

A.
B.
III.

..... 777

..... 782
................. 782
The Nineteenth Century Polley Litigation
..... 787
The Twenty-First Century Polley Trial ..............

MODERN NARRATIVES ABOUT RACE AND SLAVERY: POSTRACIALISM, RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND REPARATIONS ......

..... 789

A. Post-Racialismand the DiscontinuedRelevance of Slavery ......... 793
...... 796
B. CriticalRace Theory and an Awareness ofSlavery ....
C. Reparationsand the PresentDemandfor a MaterialRemedy
..... 799
...................
for Slavery.............
IV.
V.

TOWARDS TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: THE POLLEY CASE AS A
. . . .. .
. . . . . . .
.. .... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .
801
MODEL?
..... 806
.......................................
CONCLUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past is never dead.It's not even past.
-William

Faulkner'

A remarkable thing happened in Wayne County, West Virginia, on
April 6, 2012. Judge Darrell Pratt of the Circuit Court of Wayne County

*
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discussions about this case as well as Deirdre Bowen, Olympia Duhart and Will Rhee for their
thoughtful comments on an early version of this Essay. The author also wants to recognize Dallas
F. Kratzer III, Yasmina Ghantous, Kaitlin Clardy, and Meghan Starnes for their excellent
research assistance and contributions to this Essay. The author also wishes to thank the editorial
staff of the West Virginia Law Review for their helpful feedback and willingness to publish this
commentary on West Virginia history. Finally, the author also wishes to acknowledge the WVU
College of Law Hodges Faculty Research Fund for support of this Essay. The author takes
responsibility for all views and errors in this Essay.
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entered a decree declaring that the children of Mr. Peyton Polley-Harrison,
Louisa, and Anna 2 -who had been freed from slavery in 1849 and then
kidnapped and forced again into slavery in 1851-"were, and are, FREE
PERSONS as of March 22, 1859."' This remarkable judgment ended a 160year saga by giving a final resolution to this long-open case.4
As remarkable as this judgment is, what is more remarkable is the
motivation behind it and what it could mean for how we think about race in
twenty-first century America. The plaintiffs, through their next friend, Mr.
James L. Hale, a fifth generation descendent of Harrison Polley, pursued this
action to have a declaration on the record concerning the legal status of the
Polley children. Indeed, the Court itself, on the record, stated that it granted a
trial on this matter under its equitable powers under the nunc pro tunc doctrine 6
to "set the record straight"7 about the history of the Polley family. This was not
2
Polley v. Ratcliff, No. 12-P-(Upon A Suit For Freedom, August 1856) (W. Va. Cir. Ct.
Apr.
6,
2012)
at
14
[hereinafter
Polley],
available
at
http://assets.slate.wvu.edu/resources/710/1352817314.pdf. The factual summary that follows is
based upon the Findings of Facts rendered by the court. See generally id. at 1-6.
S
Id. at 15.
4
It is not clear why this matter was never resolved in the mid-nineteenth century. Nowhere
in the available historical record available is there an explanation as to exactly why the retrial of
this case never occurred. So we are left to speculate as to why this matter was delayed for over
150 years. For more discussion on this point see infra note 55.
The court found that Mr. Hale had standing to bring and control this lawsuit by virtue of
his status as a descendent of the original petitioners. Polley, supra note 2, at 6. In effect, the court
granted Mr. Hale "next friend" standing to bring this claim. Id. 1. "Next friend" standing is
granted in instances where a party has met all the elements of standing, but the party is incapable
due to a disability to pursue the case personally. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (9th ed.
2009). In such an instance, a court may allow another person to pursue the action on behalf of the
disabled party. Id. Thus, standing is appropriate for Mr. Hale as Polley's descendent because the
Polley children had a claim, but could not bring the claim personally. For a further explanation of
"next friend" standing in a modem context, see, e.g., Caroline Nasrallah Belk, Note, Next Friend
Standing and the War on Terror, 53 DUKE L. J. 1747, 1751-59 (2004) (explaining the common
law doctrine of "next friend" standing); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ignoring the Rule of Law: The
Courts and the GuantanamoDetainees, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 303, 307-09 (2003) (discussing
the next friend doctrine in the context of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2242).
6
Nunc pro tunc (Latin for "now for then") is an equitable power that allows a court to
retroactively effect rulings, orders, or other actions at a later time than when they should have
been done. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1174. A nunc pro tunc order from a
court is effective from the earlier date when it should have been entered upon the record. J.B.G.,
Correcting ClericalErrors in Judgments, 10 A.L.R. 526 (1921). Courts use the nunc pro tunc
doctrine to correct the record of clerical errors and errors of omission. Nunc pro tunc cannot be
used to amend judicial errors of judgment. Id. Such errors of judgment would be addressed,
instead, in the appellate process. Id.
7
Hearing, Polley v. Ratcliff, No. 12-P-(Upon A Suit For Freedom, August 1856) (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Hearing]. At the time of publication a transcript of the April 6,
2012, hearing was not available, but the Author was present at the hearing. All citations to the
hearing are based on the Author's notes, which are on file with the Author.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/9

2

Ellis: <em>Polley v. Ratcliff</em>: A New Way to Address an Original Sin

2012]

POLLEY V RATCLIFF

779

only litigation to remedy an omission from the judicial record; this litigation
represented a kind of truth telling about the American history of slavery, a
telling validated by the fact that it took place under the sanction of a court and
was validated by entry of a final judgment. This Essay will argue that this kind
of "Truth and Reconciliation" process can lead to a transformative result for the
participants and for society by allowing us to reframe our conceptions of the
legacy of American slavery.
While writing this Essay, I told various friends, acquaintances, and
colleagues about this singular happening-the trial of a Dred Scott-era
kidnapping and emancipation case. Aside from the amazement people
expressed, the story of the 2012 Polley v. Ratcliff litigation elicited reactions
that ranged from befuddlement about what this case meant, to curiosity about
the narrative, to amazement that a court would expend judicial resources on an
irrelevant matter. In particular, several of my colleagues inquired about the
legal theory behind the case; some asked what the plaintiffs in this case could
expect to get out of this decision, if anything, especially in light of the fact that
the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ended slavery.9 Other
colleagues wondered whether a follow-up suit for damages might be
appropriate in light of the emancipation ruling.o

In the 1850s emancipation or freedom suits depended upon several compounding factors.
The most notable freedom suit, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), denied a man of
African descent his freedom based on his lack of citizenship at the time the Constitution was
adopted. Not only did suits for emancipation vary according to the federal legislation, but also
based on the slavery laws of each state and the legal claim asserted. The legal issues in these
cases were multi-layered and ripe with political dispute between the free and slave states. Legal
strategy may have been premised on manumission by will, property doctrines, kidnapping,
gender, marital status, residency and birth, just to name a few. For further discussion of the
complicated nature of such suits, see, e.g., Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred
Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033, 1038-41 (1997); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael
Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free": Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of
Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1213, 1234-55 (1993); David Thomas Konig,
The Long Road to Dred Scott: Personhoodand The Rule ofLaw in the Trial Court Records of St.
Louis Slave Freedom Suits, 75 UMKC L. REv. 53, 73-79 (2006).
9
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
10 Though this is speculation, the common law basis for such a lawsuit would be under a
theory of quantum meruit or a theory of unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit is Latin for "as
much as he deserved." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1361. Quantum meruit cases
are premised on the idea that if an employee is under no legal obligation to render services, and
services are performed nonetheless, the beneficiary of the services should pay the employee the
reasonable value of the work performed. Id. See also Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Quantum
Meruit and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 27 REVIEW OF
LITIGATION 127, 129-30 (2007) (describing quantum meruit as a type of contract implied in fact

and defining contract implied in fact as "an action in restitution in which the defendant received a
gain at plaintiffs expense under circumstances that make it unjust for the defendant to keep the
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These different ways of seeing the Polley case lie at the heart of the
argument this Essay will make. This Essay claims that Polley suggests a novel
approach to thinking about our history of slavery in particular, and more
generally, a way of having discussions about the American legacy of racism.
The reactions I mentioned above revealed the three different lenses through
which we currently look at this history: the lens of reparations for damages
done during slavery; the lens of race-consciousness (even if there is nothing
one can "do" about the past); and the lens of declaring the issue moot. This last
view echoes the perspective announced in recent slavery reparation litigationthat such claims are stale"-and it echoes the post-racialism paradigm that
such discussion is irrelevant.12
Yet, some, including the family of the plaintiffs and the Circuit Court
Judge, believed that history needed to be clarified-that the record should be
set straight for the benefit of the descendants and for society. This approach-a
state-sanctioned airing of the history of racial oppression through the
acknowledgement that the Polley children were indeed free persons who were

gain."). Thus, under this theory, Ratcliff as defendant would owe the Polley children as plaintiffs
for the value of the services rendered by the children after the time the court declared the children
free. Similarly, unjust enrichment is "'the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another. . . .'
where 'the defendant received a benefit from the plaintiff. . . [and] it would be inequitable for
the defendant to retain such benefit."' Roy L. Brooks, The Slave Redress Cases, 27 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 130, 134 (2005). Thus, under this theory, Ratcliff (or his successors) would owe the Polley
children for the value of services wrongfully acquired during the period between the time they
should have been considered free, March 1859, and the time they were returned to their parents
in the mid-1860s, because during this time they were wrongfully detained and presumably were
serving as laborers. Either lawsuit would be difficult for a number of reasons, as will be
discussed infra Part III. Moreover, and important to the thesis of this Essay, the Polley
descendants did not bring such a theory and as far as I know, they will not do so because this was
not the goal of their litigation. As James Hale explained, "[w]e are seeking a ruling that the
children were free." Paul J. Nyden, Man Wants Record Clear on His Freed Ancestors, THE
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 5, 2012, at IC, available at 2012 WLNR 7261403.
1
In terms of seeking damages and reparations via the judicial system, slave descendant
litigation suits have so far proven unsuccessful. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that a group of slave descendants lacked standing to bring derivative injury
claims on behalf of their ancestors and that the statute of limitations precluded relief for their
claims brought as representatives of the slaves' estates. In re African-American Slave
Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006). In addition to lack of standing and the
statute of limitations, scholars have observed that causation and attenuation problems present
roadblocks for determining damages in slave descendant litigation and reparation debates
generally. See, e.g., Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery
ReparationsDebate, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 279,280 (2006).
12
Post-racialism has various meanings, from colorblindness to a rendering of the black-white
divide irrelevant. "In its simplest and least controversial form, the term is intended merely to
signal a hopeful trajectory for events and social trends, not an accomplished fact of social life."
Lawrence D. Bobo, Somewhere between Jim Crow & Post-Racialism:Reflections on the Racial
Divide
in
America
Today,
140
DAEDALUS
13
(2011),
available at
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/DAED-a00091.
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kidnapped and treated as chattel, along with a validating judgment where the
state acknowledges the truth of this claim-seems to suggest a lens distinct
from racial awareness, reparations, or post-racialism. The Polley litigation is
more akin to a Truth and Reconciliation approach13 to the history of slavery in
the United States. This novel methodology could lead to a needed dialogue and
transformation of understanding about race in twenty-first century America.
This Essay is meant to record the history of the Polley case within the
realm of legal academia and to inform scholars, lawyers, and the public about
this remarkable case. This is not to say that this historical period has not been
discussed at length. A number of scholars have discussed this period
generally.14 However, to my knowledge, the history of the Polley case has not
been discussed in detail in the law review literature-though several historians
have noted the famous Polley case in the academic historical literature of the
late antebellum period.' 5 More importantly, this Essay serves a second
purpose-it will use this history as a lens on the question of what our societal
response to slavery and racism has been over time and what it ought to be in the
twenty-first century. It will contemplate whether this court's approach can
begin a serious dialogue about race and reparations in the United States.
This Essay will approach this task in the following manner. In Part II, it
explores the history of the nineteenth century Polley case, and then analyzes the
April 6, 2012, judicial opinion. Through its nunc pro tunc powers, the court
sought to, in its words, "set the record straight" concerning the plight of the
Polley family both as a historical matter and in light of the fact that succeeding
generations of the Polley's descendants will bear the legacy of this decision.16
Part III of this Essay examines the broader context through which we read
cases like Polley by briefly considering our approaches to analyzing the
American legacy of slavery and racism. Part IV of this Essay considers the
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are intended to investigate these past violations of
human rights and formally acknowledge the "long-silenced past" of human rights abuses. See
Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM.
RTs. Q. 597, 600-04 (1994). As opposed to placing importance upon finding the truth underlying
these human rights abuses, these commissions serve the purpose of officially acknowledging the
truth. Id. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
13

14

See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,

1770-1823 (Cornell University Press 1975); Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial
Tolerance, and the Value of "Justice Delayed," 78 IOWA L. REv. 89 (1992); Paul Finkelman,
Scott v. Sandford: The Court's Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 3 (2007).
15

See STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS 216-19 (Ohio University Press 2005); Carol

Wilson, Freedom at Risk: The Kidnapping ofFree Blacks in America, 1780-1865, 82-92 (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University).
16
Speaking to the importance of correcting the record, Judge Darrell Pratt explained, "[i]t's a
very important piece of history for the Polley family and an incredible piece of history for Wayne
County." Bill Rosenberger, Man's Ancestors DeclaredFreed, HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington,
WV), Apr. 7, 2012, availableat 2012 WL 11097485.
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Polley decision as a different precedent for addressing the rifts of slavery. This
Essay ponders whether the Truth and Reconciliation or truth-telling approach
suggested in the Polley case is an appropriate use of governmental resources
and whether this approach-or a variation on it-could be used to address other
slavery-era wrongs more broadly. The ultimate question this Essay poses is
whether this approach can open a new avenue of reconciliation and truth telling
in relation to the history of slavery in the United States. This Essay argues that
such a conversation may better and more mindfully inform the ongoing
dialogue about reparations for racial subjugation in the United States.
II. POLLEY V. RATCLIFF: THEN AND Now
In the main, the law was afoe, not a friend to free blacks.
-Carol Wilson17
A.

The Nineteenth Century Polley Litigation'8

In November 1839, David Polley of Pike County, Kentucky, wrote a
will of manumission intended to emancipate his seven slaves. 19 Under the terms
of the will, Peyton Polley, along with his six siblings20 were to "be free and
liberated from all servitude" after David Polley's death. 2 1 After David Polley's
death in January of 1847 and the subsequent probate of his estate, the seven
Polley siblings of African descendants were emancipated.2 2 The African Peyton

Wilson, supra note 15, at 82-92.
The following account is based on the Findings of Facts rendered in Polley. Polley, supra
note 2, at 1-6. Some historians have also given substantial attention to the narrative of the Polley
family and their emancipation saga. See, e.g., MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 216-19; Wilson,
supra note 15, at 82-92. These accounts will be used to supplement this narrative.
Polley, supra note 2, at 1. His will specified that his slaves would be emancipated after his
19
death. Id at 2. The Circuit Court discussed that "lawful manumission by an owner, as well as
Court ordered emancipations, were recognized and given full faith and credit between the states."
Id. at 8 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §1). The Kentucky Constitution prior to 1850 stated that the
General Assembly "shall pass laws to permit the owners of slaves to emancipate them, saving the
rights of creditors, and preventing them from becoming chargeable to the county in which they
reside." ASA EARL MARTIN, THE ANTI-SLAVERY MOVEMENT IN KENTUCKY PRIOR TO 1850, at 14
n.14 (Cornell University 1918) (citing KY. CONST. art. VII, §1(1799)).
20
Peyton's siblings included Dug, William, Jude, Martha, John, and Spencer. Polley, supra
17
18

note 2, at 1.

Id 1-2.
Id. at 2. The probate of David Polley's estate was contested by Nancy Polley Campbell,
David's daughter, and her husband David Campbell (among others). Id. The estate and the
Campbells reached a settlement where certain real estate from David Polley's estate was sold and
the Campbells were paid $500. Id. Once the estate was settled, the Polleys of African descent
were set free in accordance with Kentucky law. Id.
21

22
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Polley family, which included Peyton's spouse, Violet, and the couple's twelve
children, 23 remained in Pike County, Kentucky, near Nancy Polley Campbell
(David's daughter) and her husband, David Campbell.24 The Polley family and
the Campbell family had a good relationship.25
Although the will freed the Polleys under Kentucky law, David
Campbell and Nancy Polley Campbell decided to execute a deed of
manumission (or bill of sale) to insure the freedom of the Polleys.2 6 They took
this action because David Campbell, a failed businessman, gained a reputation
as a heavy drinker, and allegedly distributed illegal alcohol.27 He generated a
significant amount of debt from his failed enterprises and bad habits, and he
feared that his creditors would attach the Peyton Polley family as collateral to
secure Campbell's debt.2 8
To avoid this, David and Nancy sold the Peyton Polley family to
Douglas Polley, a free black man residing in Ohio, on January 20, 1849.29 The
Bill of Sale included Violet and seven children.30 The Circuit Court opinion
states that Douglas Polley paid a sum of $5 for the family, as well as other
various debts acquired by David Campbell that prohibited him from leaving
Kentucky. 31 However, other records show that Douglas Polley paid as much as
$800 to emancipate and remove the family to Ohio. 32 Once this transaction was

23

Id at 3.

Id. at 2. Nancy Polley Campbell was the daughter of David Polley. Id
25
Id. The Court specifically describes the relationship as "more as friends and neighbors than
as slaves and owner." Id.
26
Id. at 3.
27
Id. at 2.
28
Id. at 3-4. Often creditors would invoke fraudulent conveyance laws to prevent a debtor
from hiding his assets, such as slaves. Jenny Bourne Wahl, Legal Constraintson Slave Masters:
The Problem of Social Cost, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 10 n.30 (1997) (citing Littlejohn v.
Underhill, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 377, 381 (N.C. 1816)). To prohibit debtor slave-owners from
cheating creditors in such a manner, courts might disallow manumission or place slaves under the
service of the creditor until the debt was satisfied. Id at 14 n.50. However, the Polley slaves,
freed by David Polley's will, were not the property of Nancy and David Campbell, and legally
could not have been attached to satisfy Campbell's debts.
29
Polley, supra note 2, at 3. It is unclear, but records seem to show that Douglas Polley was
also a former slave of David Polley, who was emancipated by his last will and testament along
with Peyton Polley. Id. at 1; Wilson, supra note 15, at 83.
30
Polley, supra note 2, at 3.
24

31

Id

There is some conflict on this issue. The Circuit Court Opinion stated that Douglas was
required to pay the sum of $5 and additional debts incurred by David Campbell. Id. However,
Wilson's account stated that Douglas Polley paid about $800 to Nancy and David Campbell to
remove the family from Kentucky and secure their freedom. Wilson, supra note 15, at 83.
Middleton, however, stated that David Polley sold the Peyton Polley family to Douglas, for an
32
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completed, the Peyton Polley family migrated from Kentucky to Lawrence
County, Ohio, just across the Ohio River from their former residence in
Kentucky.33
After the Peyton Polley family took up residence in Ohio, David
Justice, a well-known slave catcher, reached an agreement with David
Campbell to settle a $1,000 debt in exchange for ownership of the slave
children.34 On this basis, David Justice claimed that he was the rightful owner
of the Polley children and took matters into his own hands to regain his
property.
On the night of June 6, 1850, Justice led a gang of four white men 3 5
from Kentucky across the Ohio River into Ohio. They assaulted the Polley
household and kidnapped seven of the Polley children: Hulda, Peyton (Jr.),
Harrison, Nelson, Anna, Louisa, and Martha. 36 Justice sold four of Peyton
Polley's children, Harrison, Nelson, Louisa, and Anna, to William Ratcliff of
Wayne County, Virginia 37 for $1000." Hulda, Peyton (Jr.), and Martha were
sold to James McMillian of Fayette County, Kentucky.3 9
unspecified price, and that Douglas had to also pay debts acquired by David Polley, because the
slaves were still collateral for his unsatisfied creditors. MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 216-17.
3
The account of historian Stephen Middleton differs from the Circuit Court opinion's
findings of fact on this issue. Middleton stated that David Polley put the Peyton Polley family up
for sale in order to settle his (David's) debts. MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 216. His daughter,
Nancy, persuaded him to keep the family together, and David Polley came up with the plan to
sell the family to Douglas Polley, the free brother of Peyton living in Ohio. Id. at 216. Festivities
were held shortly after the sale to celebrate the emancipation; however, according to Middleton's
account, David Polley had not satisfied the debts to his creditors, and the slave family would be
held as collateral. Id. at 217. To retain the family in his possession, Douglas was said to pay
David Polley's creditors more than $800. Id. at 217. Trying to escape his slave past and other
possible creditors of David Polley, Peyton Polley decided to relocate his family to Lawrence
County, Ohio, just across the Ohio River. Id. at 217.
34
Polley, supra note 2, at 4. Middleton described David Justice as a relative of David Polley.
Justice, according to Middleton, had been offended because he was excluded from David
Polley's will. MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 217. Justice had filed a contest of the David Polley
will, but his contest failed. Id. at 217.
The gang of kidnappers included Fildon Isaac, James Sperry, Washington Smith, and
Hamilton Willis. MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 217.
36
See MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 217; Wilson, supra note 15, at 84.
3
Although Wayne County at the time of these events was located in the western part of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, an Act of Congress during the Civil War separated the northwestern
part of Virginia from the remainder of the state and established the State of West Virginia in
1863. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 291, 301 (2002) (describing the formation of West Virginia). Thus, the twentyfirst century proceedings in the matter of the kidnapped Polley children were heard in the State of
West Virginia rather than the Commonwealth of Virginia. Though it is now a given that West
Virginia is a state of the union, it is worth noting that there is some scholarly controversy
concerning the statehood of West Virginia. The formation of West Virginia was initiated by the
fact that while the Commonwealth of Virginia was in succession, a government formed in the
western Virginia city of Wheeling and declared itself the sanctioned government of Virginia. Id.
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The cases for the freedom of the Polley children were litigated
separately in the separate states where the kidnapped children were taken.
Hulda, Martha, Peyton (Jr.), and Mary Jane won their freedom after the case
was tried in Pike and Fayette County, Kentucky, in 1853.40 Securing the
freedom of the remaining four children in Virginia proved much more difficult.
Governor Reuben Wood of Ohio initiated proceedings in Virginia, just
as he had in Kentucky.4 ' Leroy D. Walton filed a writ of habeas corpus for the
case of Peyton Polley v. William Ratcliff in 1851 in Cabell County, Virginia.42
The writ was issued, but William Ratcliff was allowed to retake possession of
the Polley children until subsequent proceedings resolved the matter.4 3 The
efforts undertaken by the State of Ohio continued through the governorships of
Salmon P. Chase and William Dennison.4 On September 15, 1854, the case
finally proceeded to trial, and the court declared the Polley children free

at 293. Under this legal fiction, this government of Virginia then granted consent to itself to
separate from the parts of Virginia in rebellion and thus petitioned for recognition as a separate
state-West Virginia. Id. at 293, 297-302. Kesavan and Paulsen correctly point out that the
creation of West Virginia raises difficult constitutional questions of principled formalism which
have impact even today. See id at 293-97. Similarly, Roger Billings has explored these questions
and contextualized this question of legality of West Virginia in a broader historical and
international law context of the meaning of succession. See Roger Billings, Constitution Day
2011 Address at West Virginia University College of Law: Lincoln, West Virginia, and the Law
of
Secession,
available
at
http://lawmediasite.wvu.edu/Mediasite/
Play/628a9123fb52485bb24e3478cf0ba70dld.
3
Polley, supra note 2, at 4; see also MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 218; Wilson, supra note
15, at 84.
3
Polley, supra note 2, at 4. Middleton, however, claimed that Justice kept four of the Polley
children for his own purposes: Hilda, Mary Jane, Martha, and Peyton (Jr.). MIDDLETON, supra
note 15, at 218. And yet Wilson identifies Alfred 0. Robards as the slave owner from Kentucky
who purchased four of the children. Wilson, supra note 15, at 84.
40
Polley, supra note 2, at 4.
4
Governor Wood appointed Joel Wilson as the State's agent to investigate the Polley case
both in Kentucky and Virginia. Wilson, supra note 15, at 84. Ralph Leete discovered that the
Kentucky children had secured their freedom from Alfred 0. Robards in the Louisville Chancery
Court in November 1851. Id at 84. Middleton states that Governor Seabury Ford was urged to
take action by Ohio abolitionists. MIDDLETON, supra note 15, at 217. His successor, Reuben
Wood, assigned Ralph Leete to address the matter in both Kentucky and Virginia. Id. at 217-18.
Leroy D. Walton was later appointed as counsel for the Virginia Polley children and
subsequently joined by Joel Wilson. Id. at 218. However, the Circuit Court of Wayne County
found that the Kentucky children procured their freedom in 1853 and identifies L. D. Walton and
John Laidley as counsel in the Virginia proceedings. Polley, supra note 2, at 4-5.
42
Wilson states that the case went to trial in 1853. Wilson, supra note 15, at 86. However, the
facts show that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on March 10, 1851, and the case
proceeded to trial on September 15, 1854. Polley, supra note 2, at 4-5.
43
Polley, supra note 2, at 5. Wilson identifies Judge Samuel McComas of Cabell County as
the justice who granted the writ of habeas corpus. Wilson, supra note 15, at 86.
4
Wilson, supra note 15, at 87-89.
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persons.45 However, in 1855, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
the decision on the grounds that the Cabell County Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case.46 Under the law at the time, the case should have been tried
where the persons in dispute resided, Wayne County, Virginia.47
Once the matter had been dismissed, John Laidley, a representative of
Ohio and resident of Virginia, filed suit against Ratcliff to sue for the freedom
of the three remaining Polley children. 4 8 Laidley filed this lawsuit in 1856 in
Wayne County, Virginia.4 9 Both Governor Chase and John Laidley shared
Ralph Leete's sentiment that "it is wrong to let the case be abandoned now; if
the Federal Government could spend $100,000 to reduce one man to slavery,o
certainly the State of Ohio should not withhold the necessary amount of means
to restore three persons to freedom." 5 The Polley case remained pending until
March 22, 1859, when an incomplete and unsigned order was filed by the court
on the record.5 2 The order suggests that counsel for Ratcliff was to show cause
why the assignment of John Laidley as counsel should be set aside, reversed,
and annulled.53 Ohio had spent more than $3,000 in prosecuting the suits and it
was unlikely that the Virginia Polleys would be returned to freedom.54 After
entry of this incomplete order, there was no further record, entry, or action in
the case until 2012.5

45
46

Polley, supra note 2, at 5.
Id

47
See Ratcliff v. Polly, 53 Va. 528, 532 (1855) (stating that the statute requires that a
complaint for a suit for freedom shall be made in "the county or to the court in the county or
corporation where the complainant shall reside, and not elsewhere").
48
Nelson Polley died in 1855. Polley, supra note 2, at 5.
49
Id
so
Middleton, supra note 15, at 218; Wilson, supra note 15, at 87.
5
Wilson, supra note 15, at 87.
52
Polley, supra note 2, at 5.

s3
But as the 2012 Circuit Court observed, this order was incomplete. Polley, supra note 2, at
5. The sentence where this was entered was not completed. Id.
54
Wilson, supra note 15, at 88.
5
It is unclear why there was nothing on the record, which explained why this case was never
adjudicated. As this order was entered in 1859, it is doubtful that the disruption of governmental
operations due to the Civil War contributed to this. Polley, supra note 2, at 5. From the evidence
available, it is simply a mystery why no further action was taken on the case. It is fair to say,
however, that Ratcliff and his counsel likely stalled for time in this case. Wilson acknowledges
that poor weather, money, and intimidation by the kidnappers likely delayed the prosecution in
the Virginia suit. Wilson, supra note 15, at 87-90. Perhaps the stalling tactics worked to continue
to push this case down the docket, and as a result Ratcliff received the benefit of having the
Polley children in custody. It is uncertain what became of the Virginia Polley children until their
eventual emancipation in 1863. Id. at 89. However, Wilson states that the case went to trial yet
again in March 1859 and was dismissed because it was brought without the authorization of the
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The Twenty-First Century Polley Trial

B.

In 2012, James L. Hale, the great, great grandson of Harrison Polley,
petitioned the Wayne County (now West Virginia) Circuit Court to hold a trial
in the Polley case. 6 The Circuit Court granted Mr. Hale's petition and a trial
was held on April 6, 2012.
At trial, the court heard the matter through deposition testimony
collected from the original trial in Polley v. Ratcliff, as well as depositions
taken from the related Polley family cases.ss The court heard deposition
testimony from Campbell and other witnesseS. 59 This testimony explained the
nature of the intention to emancipate the Peyton Polley family both by will of
manumission and by deed of manumission and to convey them to Ohio.60 Mr.
Hale and other descendants of the Peyton Polley family presented this
testimony. Additionally, members of the bar of Wayne County read into
evidence deposition testimony from William Ratcliff, David Campbell, and
David Justice.6' The essence of the defense was that David Campbell had
engaged in a sham transaction in order to protect his "property"-the Polley
children-from his creditors, including David Justice.62 On this basis, as the
argument goes, Justice was justified in returning his property from Ohio to
63
Kentucky, and the sale of his property to William Ratcliff was proper.
Judge Pratt, speaking for the Circuit Court of Wayne County, West
Virginia, rendered an Order and Judgment declaring that the Polley children

Polley children. Id. at 88. As of June 1860, Salmon Chase and Ralph Leete persisted in
continuing the case, but it disappears from the record after this point. Id. at 89.
56
At the trial, the court explained that it reviewed the historical evidence gathered by Mr.
Hale to determine whether a trial was merited in the matter. Polley, supra note 2, at 6. Mr. Hale
developed an impressive collection of primary and secondary sources, which he supplied the
court. This evidence persuaded the court that a trial proceeding was justified in this matter.
5
The trial was something of a news event. Several news outlets in West Virginia and across
the country ran stories about the trial. See, e.g., Associated Press, W. Va. Family Gets Freedom
Decree for Ancestors, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Apr. 9, 2012, at 12A, availableat 2012 WL
7559230; Michelle Goodman, Free at Last, IRONTON TRIB., Apr. 8, 2012, availableat 2012 WL
7429322; Marcus E. Howard, Righting a Wrong: Family Rejoices as Ancestors Declared Free,
MARIETTA DAILY J., May 22, 2012, available at 2012 WL 11117257; Rosenberger, supra note
16; Nyden, supra note 10; Alberta Hale Crigler, Justice for Former Slaves 162 Years Later,
VICTORVILLE DAILY PRESS (Apr. 10, 2012 3:38 PM), http://www.vvdailypress.com/articles/later33884-justice-years.html.
58
Polley, supra note 2, at 12.
59
Id
60

See Hearing, supra note 7.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.
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should have been declared free as of 1859.64 In order to exercise its power to do
so, the court relied on the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc ("now for then")
in rendering its decision.
The nunc pro tunc doctrine allows courts the equitable power to
remedy an injustice which existed due to the court's mistake or oversight in
making a ruling.65 The doctrine is designed to remedy injustices where a delay
of judgment effectively causes that judgment to be denied. In its modem usage,
the doctrine is applied to correct mistakes that affect the rights of the burdened
parties in matters such as criminal sentencing, post-conviction relief, murder
convictions, bankruptcy, and immigration proceedings. 66 Where the equities
mandate application of the doctrine, the present court exercising nunc pro tunc
power is obligated to apply the law that existed at the time the matter was being
considered (that is the "now for then" element) and either render the ruling that
was never made or render the correct ruling that is appropriate. The doctrine
cannot apply where there is no evidence of a delayed disposition or an incorrect
disposition. Interestingly, courts have applied the nunc pro tunc doctrine once
in relation to fugitive slave cases, and in relation to matters stemming from
slavery, it has never been applied since the mid nineteenth century.
In Polley v. Ratcliff, the court reasoned that the delay of over 150 years
had prejudiced the plaintiffs and that the case was appropriate for a nunc pro
tunc disposition.68 The court in its Conclusions of Law applied the law related
to fugitive slaves and the emancipation of slaves, as it existed in Ohio,
Kentucky, and Virginia during the 1850s, to the facts presented. Specifically,
the court reasoned that under the law in effect in the 1850s, the family of David
Polley had adequately affected the emancipation of the family of Harrison
Polley. 70 This was true both through the valid will of manumission that David
Polley had properly executed and duly probated 7 ' and through the deed of

Polley, supra note 2, at 15.
Id. at 13 (citing Mayo v. Whitson, 47 N.C. 231 (1855) (holding that the court record may
be amended of clerical error or omission by entry of a nunc pro tunc order in an emancipation
suit so as to establish the slave family's freedom from the date of their emancipation in February
1803)).
66
State v. Qualls, 967 N.E.2d 718 (Ohio 2012) (using nunc pro tunc to correct an omission
from the record in a sentencing hearing which included a notification of post-release control and
the denial of a new sentencing hearing); In re Vitale, 469 B.R. 595 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012)
(ordering that an automatic stay of a foreclosure sale was annulled nunc pro tunc pertaining to
actions taken by the creditor to repossess the collateral property, which was found to be
abandoned by the bankruptcy estate).
67
Mayo, 47 N.C. 231.
68
Polley, supra note 2, at 6.
69
Id. at 9-12.
70
Id. at 9-10.
6

65

71

Id.
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manumission (or bill of sale) of the Polley family by David and Nancy
Campbell to Douglass Polley. 72 Thus, it followed that the detention of the
Polley children by David Justice and the detention of the children (and their
return to slavery) by William Ratcliff was unlawful.7 3 Moreover, the court
rejected as a common and outlawed strategy that the defense raised by Ratcliff
that the bill of sale was fraudulent.74 On this basis, the Circuit Court of Wayne
County, West Virginia reached the conclusion that the Polley children should
have been, and are, declared free persons as of 1859.
III. MODERN NARRATIVES ABOUT RACE AND SLAVERY: POST-RACIALISM,
RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND REPARATIONS

We do not see things as they are, we see them as we are.
-Anais Nin76
The Polley case brings to the present a past that is often referred to, but
not often discussed, in non-academic contemporary contexts. Indeed, Judge
Pratt and the Polley descendants had a dual purpose in bringing this 150 years
overdue case to trial. The judge and the descendants sought to "set the record
straight"77 for the knowledge of the Polley descendants and to raise the
historical awareness of the general public. In doing so, this case raises larger
concerns about how we ought to consider the American history of slavery in
our modern context. This next section will offer some introductory remarks on
this matter and then briefly examine our varying approaches to this questionhow America considers the narrative of slavery and the resulting challenges of
race that come with it.

72

Id.atl1-11.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15.

7s

76
ANAIs NIN, SEDUCTION OF THE MINOTAUR 124 (1961). This version of the quote is so often
recited that the quote's origin is difficult to pinpoint. However, the Nin quote above does capture
this thought wholly. Yet it is fair to provide the quote in its full context: "Lillian was reminded of
the Talmudic words: 'We do not see things as they are, we see them as we are."' Id However,
the author's research has not been able to pinpoint this quote in The Talmud.
n
Hearing, supra note 7.
78
See id. It is also worth mentioning that the Polley descendants sought this action to bring
"legal closure" to this matter. See Rosenberger, supra note 16. Indeed, descendant Anisa DyeHale (plaintiff James Hale's daughter-in-law) saw this lawsuit as "righting a wrong that's 160
years in the making." See infra Part IV.
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To put it directly, slavery has often been called the "original sin" 79 of
the United States.s0 Slavery existed in each one of the thirteen original colonies.
And although never referred to by name in the document itself, the original
Constitution of the United States made reference to and laid a foundation for
the federal government to mediate the political economy of slavery during the
first half of the nineteenth century.' Subsequently, the abolition of slavery and
the effort to address the consequences of its ending were the key purpose of the
Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. These amendments have

7
The Online Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the phrase "original sin" as "a wrong of
great magnitude" and cites as illustration "the originalsin of slavery." OriginalSin, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/original%20sin (last visited Oct. 5,
2012). As a Judeo-Christian theological concept, "original sin" represents the fallen nature of
human beings that defines human nature and requires enduring work of forgiveness. As a
metaphor for the relationship between the United States, slavery, and racism, scholars have
articulated the relationship between slavery (as both received history and open wound) and its
inextricable relationship with modem-day racism. See, e.g., George H. Taylor, Racism as "The
Nation's CrucialSin": Theology andDerrick Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269 (2004) (analogizing
Derrick Bell's view of racism and the theological view of sin, in that both are permanent and
inextricable, yet human action is still meaningful and the struggle against racism is still
worthwhile).
8o
This naming, in and of itself, is a divisive and difficult enterprise. I believe it is so because
it strikes at the heart of the ongoing and enduring wound that slavery represents. Thus, as Alfred
Brophy has observed, it represents an ongoing culture war. See Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural
War Over Reparationsfor Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1209-10 (2004) (discussing the
divided arguments concerning reparations and how talk of reparations for our "sins of the past" is
in and of itself, divisive among Americans). This ongoing culture war has even recently
confronted the narrative of post-racialism-the idea that America has atoned for its "original sin"
of slavery. See generally Susan Schulten, Barack Obama,Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey, 86
DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 812-15 (2009) (comparing President Barack Obama to Abraham Lincoln
through the idea that although slavery was our "original sin," "a more perfect Union" can be
achieved with every successive generation, from the abolition of slavery to the perfection of race
relations).
8
The most famous example of this is the "three-fifths compromise" in Article I of the
United States Constitution:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3. This rule re-enforced the political economy of slavery in the
South through basing political representation on slavery, and thus further fostering African
American slave subordination. See Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens Unitedand Tiered Personhood,44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 711, 723 n.25. See also DERRICK BELL, RACE RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW
28 (6th ed. 2008) (naming the three-fifths compromise as a scheme "to sublimate the rights of
blacks to the interests of whites"). For further discussion of the role that slavery played in the
creation of the Constitution, see generally Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law
Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REv. 1123, 1143-44 (2012).
For a narrative of this history, see LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, DARK BARGAIN: SLAVERY, PROFITS,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION (2005).
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defined our constitutional law and serve as a cornerstone of the individual
rights every American holds.
Moreover, slavery and the racial, cultural, and political divides that
slavery created have been intrinsic parts of the history and present-day culture
of the United States. Though it goes beyond the scope of this short Essay to
provide an extended discussion of the history of slavery and its overarching
contribution to defining modem American race relations, most would agree to
the basic proposition that slavery defined the American condition. The
question then becomes how best to understand this past and what relevance
should it have in our present. The claim of this Essay is that slavery is the
defining first idea of relations between peoples in the United States.84
At the heart of this idea is the notion that slavery has defined this
nation and shaped its contours. This claim creates a narrative lens through
which one might view how American society functions and what its core
principles are.85 Slavery thus created a narrative within the United States about
For salient discussions of this issue, see, e.g., W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK
(Penguin Books 1989) (1903); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, FROM
82

SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (9th ed. 2011); SUSAN WELCH ET AL.,
RACE & PLACE: RACE RELATIONS IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2001); Bobo, supra note 12; Lawrence

D. Bobo & Camille Z. Charles, Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the
Obama Candidacy, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009), available at
http://www.wjh.harvard.edulsoc/faculty/bobo/pdf/20documents/RaceMind.pdf.
83
For an enlightening discussion of how slavery shaped the United States Constitution and
how as a result slavery and the legacy of racism are fundamental to an understanding of the
United States, see Perea, supra note 81, at 1143-44.
84
Specifically, this narrative suggests that one's physical characteristics-one's "race"demark one's social status to the exclusion of all other factors. See Deirdre Bowen, Meeting
Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race and Class Diversity, 88 DENv. U. L. REV.
751, 756-60 (2011) (describing the concept of "master status" as a way of framing the analysis
of race). Erving Goffman recognized this effect when he articulated the concept of a "master
status" for a person: a person possess a master status when that person has a characteristic that
overrides all other features of the person's identity. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). As Bowen explains, "In the case of race, a set
of stereotypical traits are imputed on students of color because of one's racial or ethnic status
overrides all other statuses an individual may possess. These auxiliary traits then determine how
others will interact with the student." Bowen, supra, at 757 n.42. Though Bowen was focusing
specifically on African American students in her study, this description of how master status
shapes our consideration of persons of different races is apt and lies at the heart of this Essay and
its claim that the narrative of slavery has strongly influenced the master status for African
Americans.
85

See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic

eds., 2d ed. 2000) (a collection of essays and articles portraying the idea that race and race
relations need to be told in a various narratives in order to be better understood); NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995) (a

collection of essays examining race, values, power and beliefs through a variety of competing
narratives); Derrick Bell, Learning the Three "I's" ofAmerica's Slave Heritage, 68 CHI.- KENT
L. REv. 1037 (1993).
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how Americans should understand the damage done by slavery.16 In this
narrative, slavery created (or at least contributed to) a hierarchy based upon
white male supremacy and the subjugation of women and people of color.8 7
While some might argue that this is the correct assumption through which to
understand American society, others would argue that such assumptions are no
longer warranted given the passage of time and the advancements that
minorities have made in American society.88
At the heart of this larger debate is the question of what remedy, if any,
ought to be provided in light of the harms one believes are still relevant from
the history of slavery (assuming one believes there are still present harms). Put
another way, what obligation still exists to create equality between those who
suffered slavery and those who benefitted from slavery? There are those who,
depending on their narrative, would argue that the harms of slavery have
already been remedied, or would argue that the harms need to be addressed in
an ongoing way. Even though it may appear that this issue is one of mere
history, these debates about remedies for the legacy of slavery continue in
modem-day issues, like affirmative action.89
Although one might debate the effects of slavery on modem-day
America, the Polley case presents a different challenge: How should one speak
of this history and what remedies for specific actions in the past should be
carried out in the present? Rather than focus on cumulative effects and societal
changes over time, the Polley case forces us to consider whether, how, and to
what extent the past should be spoken of in the present. It requires us to think
about historical mindfulness and concrete facts about our collective past.
Nonetheless, any American reading these cases approaches them with
some combination of three modem narratives about slavery and racism in the
United States. We must inevitably view the history of the Polley case through
these lenses. This part of the Essay will now turn to briefly analyzing the core
assumptions of each of these lenses. It will begin by examining the ideology of
post-racialism, the view that America no longer needs to consider the problems
of racism in its public policy discourse. Then, the Essay will discuss what I am
calling the race-conscious viewpoint, which claims that racism is present,
salient, and should be considered in addressing modern-day public policy
86
"[T]he damage done to modem-day blacks as a consequence of the institution of American
slavery continues even several centuries after the official abolishment of slavery in the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Kevin Hopkins, Review Essay, Forgive U.S. Our Debts?
Righting the Wrongs ofSlavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2532-34 (2001).
8
Ralph Richard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness:Neo-Racialism and the Future of Race and
Law Scholarship, 25 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 44 (2009) (discussing the racism narrative
generated by America's slave past and the current racism narrative with the election of Barack
Obama to the presidency).
88
See discussion infra Part III.A.
89
See Bell, supra note 85, at 1043-44 (recognizing that one of the major debates concerning
affirmative action is based on white backlash).
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concerns. Finally, this section will examine the reparations approach, which not
only claims that racism is salient in modem-day society, but that compensation
ought to be paid for the overt harms done by the majority to the minorities
during the period of de jure racial subjugation. Then, in the next part, this
Essay will consider in more detail how the Polley case may offer a different
approach through which we might consider our collective-and individualpast.
A.

Post-Racialismand the DiscontinuedRelevance of Slavery

Probably the most contemporary lens through which the American
dilemma of race is viewed (and as a result it provides a narrative for the history
of slavery) is the idea that America is a "post-racial" society.90 The narrative
relies on the premise that American society has concluded its struggle with race
and, therefore, when it comes to the structuring of our laws, there is no further
need to discuss issues of race. It is the ideology that claims that America has
moved beyond race and that there is thus no need to discuss race as a salient
issue.9 1
Scholars have explained that post-racialism works as an ideology-it
offers a point of view about the world and, thus, allows the adherent to consider
and reflect on various issues through this particular lens.92 In particular,
Professor Sumi Cho points out that the power of post-racialism is that of
making conversations about race irrelevant to the adherent of the ideology.93
Adopters of the post-racialism point of view tend to discount the importance of
race as the relevant guidepost for the way society is organized.94 Conversations
about race become irrelevant, and those who wish to discuss race are seen as
divisive and destructive.9
Working in close relationship with post-racialism is the separate but
complementary view of colorblindness. 96 Colorblindness is an aspirational
concept that takes expression for many as a view that by force of societal

Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to
Move Forward,43 CONN. L. REv. 1253, 1313-15 (2011) (observing that a post-racial America is
a "racially egalitarian America" where the post-racial discourse is used to de-historicize race in
American society); see also Lawrence Auster, What is Post-RacialAmerica?, VIEW FROM THE
RIGHT (Feb. 25, 2008, 10:56 AM), http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/010000.html
(discussing the notion of post-racial America during an Obama presidency).
91
Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 lowA L. REV. 1589, 1594-95 (2009).
92
Id. at 1594.
9
Id. at 1594-95.
94
Id. at 1595.
9
Id. at 1595, 1601-02.
9
Id. at 1597; Donna E. Young, Post Race Posthaste: Towards an Analytical Convergence of
CriticalRace Theory and Marxism, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 499, 502 (2012).
90
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change, race will become irrelevant throughout society; where, in contrast,
post-racialism is an ideology which shapes decisions about how the world
ought to be viewed and explains choices concerning issues regarding race.97
Professor Cho argues that colorblindness, though it is still important to
the mainstream, traditional political right, is relatively outmoded in comparison
to the ideology of post-racialism.9 Post-racialism is more virulent and
persuasive because it represents an ideology that converges with enough of the
facts of the moment and the hopes of people across the political spectrum to
offer a salient battle-is-over analysis of the current state of race relations in the
United States. 99 Put more directly, post-racialism offers the point of view that
the ideology of White Supremacyoo has effectively run its course, and thus, the
adherents of White Supremacy are no longer forced to confront their own
prejudice.10' White people are, therefore, redeemed of their prejudices and
absolved of their past bad conduct. 102
Thus, from this point of view, discussions about race are irrelevant to
the public policy and legal conversations of our era. For political conservatives,
analyses of social problems are cast in terms of defending the apparent status
quo and the existing hierarchy of social class as neutral and beyond race.' 0 3 In
particular, analysis of social problems is placed in the context of completing the
(illegitimate, they would argue) mission of remedying racial inequality.' 04 From

9
98

Cho, supra note 91, at 1597-98.
Id at 1599-1600.

99
See Sheryll Cashin, Shall We Overcome? "Post-Racialism" and Inclusion in the 21st
Century, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 31, 33-41 (2011) (examining the relevance of race and the
state of race relations in the political discourse in a post-racial America); Cho, supra note 91, at
1601.
100 Wendy Brown Scott has stated that White Supremacy "describes the system of racial
subordination instituted to perpetuate the domination of African-Americans and people of color
generally." Wendy Brown Scott, TransformativeDesegregation:LiberatingHearts and Minds, 2
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 321 n.27 (1999) (citing Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes:
Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1024 n. 129
(1989) (defining White Supremacy as "a political, economic and cultural system in which whites
overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white
superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white
subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings.")). It is
in Scott's and Ansley's meanings that I use the phrase "White Supremacy." I have capitalized the
phrase in this Essay to illustrate that this is an ideological system and to demonstrate its
dominance to the reader. For further discussion in relation to race-conscious thinking, see infra
notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
1o1 Peter Halewood, Laying Down the Law: Post-Racialism and the De-RacinationProject,72
ALB. L. REv. 1047, 1049-50 (2009).
102
Id. at 1050-52.
103
john a. powell, An Agenda for the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 889, 892-93
(1995).
104

id.
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this point of view, for example, the election of Barack Obama becomes a
hallmark of triumph, and thus, the attention that the left wing racial rabblerousers have received can be directed to other issues.105 Moreover, the
ideological oppression of the right can be lifted. In other words, the
condemnation that it suffers for perpetuating racial hierarchies is now invalid
because a minority has ascended to the highest office in the land, thus feeding
the narrative that any person may have access to the social goods of the United
States without being limited by race.ios
Similarly, for the political left, the completion of the conflict
concerning race also liberates American society from further need of discussion
of the topic. To use again the example of the election of President Obarma, it
represents the ability to move on to more important concerns because the battle
concerning race is now complete, and the liberal vision of America in terms of
race is now a reality. 0 7 Moreover, the problems of social inequality are viewed
as having to do with factors other than race-for example, the misdistribution
of educational benefits is considered to be one that can be remedied by
emphasis on class analyses rather than race. 0 8
The effect of this shift of the mode of thinking is that we now arguably
have a society that desires to avoid altogether conversations that have to do
with race generally. 0 9 This, in essence, completes the work done by the legal
movement towards colorblindness. The aspirational scheme of colorblindness
sought to steadily move away from a vision of combating racism towards a
vision of a world where race is completely irrelevant.' 10 Conversations about
race are relegated to the past, and those who attempt to raise the issue are seen
as irrelevant. This is despite the mountain of evidence of the role race plays in

t05 Karla Mari McKanders, Black and Brown Coalition Building During the "Post-Racial "
Obama Era, 29 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 473, 473-75 (2010) (critiquing the idea that the
election of an African American president has transformed American society into a post-racial
era, when in fact great disparities remain among Whites, African Americans, and Latinos).
106
See, e.g., Clarence Lusane, Obama's Victory and the Myth of Post-Racialism, in APPLIED
RESEARCH CTR., CHANGING THE RACE: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE ELECTION OF BARACK OBAMA

at
available
2009),
ed.,
Burnham
(Linda
68
67,
http://www.arc.org/downloads/RaceElections l_R5.pdf (commenting on the idea of postracialism following the election of President Obama, Clarence Lusane comments that many
conservatives felt as though "[r]acism was no longer an issue because the nation had become
colorblind").
107
See McKanders, supranote 105, at 474.
108
Cho, supra note 91, at 1595, 1602.
109
Banks, supra note 87, at 45-46 (expressing the idea that many believe Martin Luther King
Jr.'s "dream" has been realized in our post-racial society electing Barack Obama as president and
wish to relegate racial conflicts and division to the past).
110
Cho, supra note 91, at 1595, 1601-02; john a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society:
Race Functioningas a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. 99, 116 (1997).
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political conversations from day to day."' Post-racialism represents the
achievement of this goal to those who buy into the ideology. The logical
conclusion of such a view is that the issue of race as a framework for
organizing preferences and priorities in our society is outmoded.
Thus, the post-racialist lens would likely treat a unique historical
occurrence like the Polley litigation as historical trivia, and therefore view it as
irrelevant to modern considerations. More to the point, a post-racialist view
would see this as an interesting story about a kidnapping over 150 years ago,
but would likely deem it a waste of time for a court to be involved in rehashing
wounds from a time long past concerning a history that is no longer relevant.
And even if the history were relevant for historical purposes, the use of judicial
resources and governmental action in making a declaration of freedom would
nonetheless be a waste.
B.

CriticalRace Theory and an Awareness of Slavery

In contrast to the race-is-now-irrelevant position of the ideology postracialism and colorblindness, the ideology of race-consciousness begins with
the assumption that racism is a tool through which society is organized, and
thus, racial hierarchies exist and affect how we see the world."12 Racism is a
present reality, and, thus, policy and practice on both a societal level and an
individual level should take this into account in order to improve the state of
being throughout our society.
Racism, as both a collective and an individual nature, serves to
structure our society. As a collective matter, racism creates a hierarchy where
society is structured along racial lines so that members of one race receive
more status and benefits than others." 3 In particular, in the United States
especially, members of the white race have been the beneficiaries of this
distribution where members of other races-for example, Blacks, Latinos, and

II
Brandon Paradise, Racially Transcendent Diversity, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 415 (2012)
(describing the concept of "racially transcendent diversity" where America has not yet moved
beyond race into post-racialism, but seeks to rise above race while also embracing racial
diversity); powell, supra note 110, at 116.
112
Tara J. Yosso, Whose Culture Has Capital? A Critical Race Theory Discussion of
Community Cultural Wealth, 8 RACE ETHNiclTY & EDUC. 69, 73-74 (2005) (defining the five
tenements
of
Critical
Race
Theory),
available
at
http://www.cgu.edu/PDFFiles/ses/TEIP/Tara%20J.%20Yosso%20culturalwealth.pdf.
113
Derrick Bell, The Racism Is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation of Unconscious
Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 571, 573 (1993) (addressing criticisms of his
thesis in his book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well, that "racism is an integral, permanent, and
indestructible component" of American society where white dominance is maintained).
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Asian Americans-have been denied the same degree of benefit.1 14 Indeed,
members of these groups have suffered detriment. Given the nature of the
system, race-conscious theorists would call this a system of White Supremacy.
This system of racial preference distributes prime material benefits to white
people and denies or creates a detriment to people of other races.' 15
In addition to the material nature of racism, racism also has an
ideological dimension.' 16 Racism forms a lens through which one sees the
world, or, put another way, it creates a narrative that has explanatory power
about how the world is structured. Racism as ideology provides "a pool of
beliefs, symbols, metaphors, and images that justify and 'naturalize' its
practices." 17 Racism creates a narrative by which one might apply this
particular logic whereby one can understand the world. Thus, the racial
distribution of property and privilege and social status has a justification. It also
provides a view of history whereby the distribution and the beliefs are
rationalized and made functional. Racism is both a system of privilege and an
epistemology.
The question then becomes whether and how to combat this system in
its modem-day guise. For the person who believes this entire narrative, and
sees it as the correct structure, no further analysis is necessary. Obviously, this
person would be an unrepentant White Supremacist--content with the
ideological structure of the world as is (or this person may even desire a shift of
the current system of racism to be more in line with his or her ideology). In
contrast, the adherent to the race-conscious point of view of which I speakwhich perceives racial discrimination as a wrong-would believe that raceconsciousness is the beginning of an effort to effect a remedy to such
discrimination.' 18
Logically, such a desire to combat the system of White Supremacy
would begin with the question of whether the ideology of racism can ever be
supplanted. The late Professor Derrick Bell, who is often touted as the founder
of the Critical Race Theory intellectual movement in the legal academy,
famously argued that racism is permanent. 119 In other words, racism is an

14
See, e.g., RAKESH KOCHHAR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH
GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS (2011), available at

http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report 7-26-11 FINAL.pdf.
"
JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA
5-6 (2d ed. 2007).
116
Id. at 6.
117
Id.
See Bell, supra note 85, at 1048-49.
See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992). Both books set forth the theme that racism is permanent in American Society, yet this
truth is not despairing for African Americans; in contrast, it is a liberating concept, which will
"

119
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immutable characteristic of American society and it is impossible to eradicate.
To this end, Bell believed that conscious awareness of racism would lead to a
more sane and aware scope of life for individuals and for society.120 For others,
strands of critical race theory have taken a different tact than Bell and do not
necessarily agree that racism is permanent.1
Despite what view one might take concerning the ultimate nature of
racism, most race-conscious theorists would agree that advocacy against racism
is an appropriate reaction to societal and institutional racism, and that laws of
antidiscrimination and conscious awareness of interpersonal interaction would
provide a way to ultimately combat-and ideally eliminate-racism on the
personal and cultural level. Thus, like the aspiration of colorblindness, the raceconscious combatant of racism would seek a day where racism is irrelevant to
our modern lives, but the race-conscious school of thought does not believe that
this goal has been reached in the present day. Thus, it must be combated
continually through efforts to make people aware of the material harms, status
harms, and psychic harms that racism causes. 122
Within this context, the race-conscious ideology would value an
exploration of the history of race revealed by cases like the Polley kidnapping.
Conscious confrontation of the "original sin" of slavery and its continuing
effects is necessary from this ideological point of view.12 3 Thus, an explanation
of the harms of slavery and the objectifying nature of its practice-as the
Polley case illustrates vividly-is a necessary and welcome exercise. Indeed, in
the Polley case specifically, the narrative is powerful precisely because a legal
institution legitimized the Polley descendants' claims. In this sense, the Polley
family is validated and legitimized because society has recognized their
ancestors' proper status as "FREE PERSONS."1 24 Moreover, the Polley court,
through undertaking the hearing and ruling in this case, expresses the values of
our modem society. It is powerful to hear the implicit pronouncement of
freedom despite imposed slavery by a court of law, even if this effort at justice

encourage the continued commitment to racial equality and justice. Bell recognizes that African
Americans have made significant strides in the civil rights struggle, but that the inability of
whites as a group to identify with blacks inhibits them from empathy for the suffering of blacks.
120
Derrick Bell, RacialRealism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 377-79 (1992).
121
Taylor points out that a comparison of the different strands of Critical Race Theory may
reveal differences on the question of whether racism is permanent. See Taylor, supra note 79, at
321 n.389 (comparing Bell with Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic's religious beliefs and how
they shape the concerning the nature of racism).
122
See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
62-69 (1992).
123
Taylor, supra note 79, at 282-83 (proposing that the realization of racism's permanence in
our society is a necessity and that confrontation with this "necessity" in terms of protest, racial
realism, and writing are beneficial and important for a renewed vision of the continued struggle
for racial justice).
124
Polley, supra note 2, at 15.
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was 150 years delayed. Furthermore, through naming the history that the Polley
children and their descendants suffered, it would, from this view, go a long way
to remedying the psychic harms of slavery and its long legacy.
However, even in the race-conscious approach, there are limits. While
the Polley case may be useful as a psychic exercise to raise consciousness, it
would not necessarily satisfy the remedial needs for the harms caused. Those
critical race theorists would believe that such a debt exists, whether that debt is
material, financial, or psychic, and that the debt should be paid as a necessary
step in racial reconciliation. This leads us to discuss the reparations position.
C.

Reparationsand the PresentDemandfor a Material Remedy for
Slavery

Within the realm of race-conscious ideology is a particular movement
that is directed to the state's obligation to address the harms of slavery and the
long legacy of racism. This particular claim is premised on the notion that
awareness is insufficient to remedy the harms of slavery and racism. The
reparations school of thought would arue that racism has created tangible
material harms against specific people) 5 They, and their descendants, have
suffered material, status, and psychic harms as a result of the existence of
racism, and those harms should be remedied. Moreover, the White Supremacist
power structure perpetuated and benefitted from such economic, physical, and
psychic injury. The nature of society today is built upon this foundation, and,
therefore, those who benefit from it should remedy this injurious situation by
providing compensation-reparations-to those who have suffered the harms.
This argument has societal and individual dimensions. However, most
of the modern debates concerning reparations are about remedying societal and
broad economic harms.126 Various reparations lawsuits have been brought to
remedy specific harms such as race riots, systemic and specific harms to groups
of people of color, medical experimentation on people of color, and similar
large-scale harms.127 These lawsuits have failed, however, due to a number of

125 See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing Historical
Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REv. 127, 133-34 (2008) (defining the term historical injustice in
America as a wrong which was authorized or institutionalized by the government, committed at
least a generation ago, harmed many individuals, and involved discrimination based on race,
religion or ethnicity; slavery is included as an historical injustice in the United States).
126 See Kaimipono David Wenger, From Radical to Practical (and Back Again?):
Reparations,Rhetoric, and Revolution, 25 J. C.R. & EcON. DEv. 697, 705-06 (2011). This article
compares the two basic approaches to the reparations argument: radical reparations arguments,
which seek changes such as restructuring society, and practical reparations, which seeks specific
gains such as monetary compensation.
127
See, e.g., In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill.
2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006).
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legal concerns regarding standing, the complexity of causation, statute of
limitations, and the difficulty of conceptualizing the remedy.12 8
Another theoretical issue concerning the reparations movement is how
to conceptualize the nature of the remedy. 12 9 As suggested above, those who
advocate for reparations often see themselves as wishing to address material
economic and social harms. 13 0 Most often this is framed as a consideration of
specific economic compensations for damages done.' 3 ' But others have framed
this consideration as repairing the status and cultural harms done by long-term
racism, such as providing educational benefits and economic revitalization to
minorities so as to remedy the effects of slavery. 13 2 There are those who have
also argued that an apology, given the authority of and on behalf of the state,
would also count as a type of reparation.' 3 3
From this point of view, the unearthing of facts relating to the harms of
slavery would be the first necessary step to providing compensation for its
harms. It would then follow that the person to be held accountable-or their
successors-would then provide compensation for the harms done to the
minority or former slave or their successors. It would, in and of itself, establish
a relationship and require a connection that recognizes the nature of the harm
and provides compensation for it.
In light of these competing ways of understanding the history of
slavery, the twenty-first century Polley case represents something that is
different from the three modalities described above. The Polley descendants did
not ask for any compensation, or any apology, or any concession from the state.
This would certainly not represent an effort to obtain reparations as classically
conceived. The act of adjudicating this case (where the legal need to do so in
light of the Thirteenth Amendment might be thought of as dubious by some)

128
See Wenger, supra note 126, at 724. For the specific cases relevant to this discussion, see
the earlier discussion supra note 11.
129
See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparationsfor
Slavery,
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 497 (2003).
130
Wenger, supra note 126, at 705-06.

131
132

Id.

See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, in RACE AND
RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 732-38 (2000).
133
Proponents of apology-based remedies, which may or may not include other forms of
reparations, term this as restorative justice which aims to restore society through reconciliation.
Roy L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 14143, 147-48 (2004) (articulating a reliance on apology in order to atone for the damage done by
slavery, whereas a government that has committed such an atrocity has a moral obligation to
apologize); see also Kaimipono David Wenger, Apology Lite: Truths, Doubts, and Reconciliation
in the Senate's Guarded Apology for Slavery, 42 CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 9 (2009), available at
http://connecticutlawreview.org/files/2012/02/Wenger-FINALforonline.pdf (pointing out that
stand-alone apologies can indeed have value, but that limitations and disclaimers attached to that
apology generates mixed reactions).
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and putting the imputer of the state upon this decision definitely flies in the face
of the post-racialist model. A race-conscious theorist would see value in
unearthing and making people aware of this history, and they would find a
declaration or judgment remedying the error of omission at the heart of the
West Virginia Polley case essential to an understanding of the present fight
against racism. And certainly a post-racialist attitude would deny wholesale the
need to even have this conversation, and in particular, place judicial resources
behind such a declaration. At best, such a view would relegate the Polley case
to the history books.
If the Polley case does not fit our current models of how to think about
race, and as a result how we view the history of slavery, then what does it
represent? The next part of this Essay will attempt to offer some thoughts on
this by considering the Polley case as a nascent Truth and Reconciliation
approach to understanding our history of slavery.
IV. TOWARDS TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: THE POLLEY CASE AS A MODEL?

Slavery is the greatest atrocity in human history. For my kids
to witness the freedom of their ancestors is overwhelming.
-

Anisa Dye-Hale'34

The Polley case is novel on several levels. First, it is the first time since
1855 that a court has used nunc pro tunc to remedy a slavery case. 135 This, by
itself, is quite fascinating and may represent an interesting piece of trivia. Were
this all that the Polley case represented, there would not be much else to say.
It could be argued, however, that the Polley case decision is a step
towards truth telling with respect to the institution of slavery and the harms it
continues to instill. This is reminiscent of various Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions that have taken place across the world to address the human
rights abuses inflicted by national governments, militaries, or armed forces of
each respective country.136 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are intended
to investigate these past violations of human rights and formally acknowledge
this "long-silenced past."' 3 ' As opposed to placing importance upon finding the
truth underlying these human rights abuses, these commissions serve the

Rosenberger, supra note 16.
The last recorded instance that the author could find of this use of nunc pro tunc is in Mayo
v. Whitson, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 231 (1855). Cf Polley, supra note 2, at 13-14.
136
Hayner, supra note 13, at 600-04. These truth commissions may be sponsored by the
nation's government or, alternatively on the international scale, by the United Nations or
nongovernmental organizations.
137
id
134
135
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purpose of officially acknowledging the truth.'38 Although the principle of truth
commissions is to acknowledge the truth and heal the wounds of the past, they
are not always successful and can be set up by a government to manipulate the
public's perception.139
Seen in this light, the Polley case is novel in a different and potentially
more transformative respect. The Polley trial of 2012, by virtue of the fact that
both the descendants of the Polley children and the Circuit Court of Wayne
County, West Virginia felt it necessary to "set the record straight"l 40 about the
status of the kidnapped Polley children, took a new approach to addressing the
harm of slavery.' ' The plaintiffs and the court explicitly sought to address
directly the history of stigma through utilizing nunc pro tunc to conclude an
adjudication and make a declaration that the Polley children should have been
declared free persons as of 1859.142
Admittedly, this situation is probably as unique as it is novel. The
likelihood of similar cases concerning emancipated slaves who were then
kidnapped wrongfully and for whom nunc pro tunc adjudication would be
appropriate is probably quite low. And even if it were not low, the fact of the
matter is that the amount of historical research necessary to bring to light
another similar case would be extraordinary.' 4 3
138

id.

139
See Hayner, supra note 13, at 607-08. Indeed, one might object to this approach on this
basis. It could be argued that by merely acknowledging this lawsuit, the court acted to provide
some validation but nonetheless validated its own status as an institution of power and its role
within the power structure in relation to race. Thus, any claim of movement towards racial
healing would be perceived as ineffective and illusory, or even deceptive. This rings true with the
history of Truth and Reconciliation commissions (and similar activities sponsored by
governments) designed to merely re-enforce the power structure of the government. Moreover,
research has shown that Truth and Reconciliation commissions which are perceived as merely
Band-Aids and do not have popular support create atmospheres that are eventually counter to
their stated purpose. See, e.g., ROSALIND SHAW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND
LEONE (2005), available at
LESSONS FROM SIERRA
RECONCILIATION CoMMIssIoNs:
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/srl30.pdf. In noting these difficulties, however, I think there
is a value to these commissions, or some similar governmental task. Truth-telling that is allowed
to validate individual stories and raise the consciousness of the surrounding community can take
place in a context like the United States, a developed country that would not rely on the
commission to bolster its own legitimacy. Such a process could be directed at raising awareness
about the legacy of race in and of itself, and thus ultimately serve a personal and a communal
good, as I describe below.
140
See Hearing,supra note 7.
141 Polley, supra note 2, at 13-14 (stating that the prior petition for freedom on behalf of the
Polley children was "unreasonably delayed" and "erroneously concluded without a final order on
the merits, and therefore, it is appropriate for nunc pro tunc resolution").
142

Id.

"There are not many people, period, in the world who can find their family history
documented. It's overwhelming. It's knowing who you are and where you came from. For many
African-Americans that's not possible." Crigler, supra note 57.
143
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In these respects, Polley defies these odds. As both the judge and the
family members pointed out, their desire was to "set the record straight"'" and
to bring to light this unresolved history.145 This seems to run counter to the
trends of wanting to avoid conversations of slavery and its effects; it brings it to
light so that the family that suffered its indignity can know the truth and the
present community can acknowledge and at least be aware of its history.
This deliberate choice represents an important model-or at least an
important suggestion-about how to approach the difficult history of slavery in
our society. Though there is not likely a literal open case waiting for
adjudication like Polley, conversations could nonetheless be based on the
reality of slavery and a concrete consideration of that history based on what
happened to the real enslaved people and the injustices they faced. Put another
way, the twenty-first century adjudication of the Polley case represented an
instance where the plaintiffs' representatives had the opportunity to name the
indignity they suffered and claim redress-even if the redress only has
rhetorical force over 150 years after the crime was committed-and a court
recognized and sanctioned that need.
This kind of truth telling is reminiscent of the various and occasional
efforts to establish Truth and Reconciliation projects in various places
throughout the world.14 6 In South Africa, for example, the effort to recover
from Apartheid was undergirded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
established throughout that country.14 7 Those commissions worked on the
premise that persons who were involved in the crimes and abuses of the
Apartheid regime could come and state their role and disclose completely the
crimes of which they knew. 14 8 In exchange, they were in many cases granted
amnesty for their actions, 14 9 but they were required to face the public and
acknowledge their actions. 50 The benefits were numerous, including the ability
for both the perpetrators of the crimes and the victims (or their descendants) to
know the whole truth about the actions of the state during that time.'"' This
created a path for dialogue and created a possibility for national healing-a

See Hearing, supra note 7.
See Goodman, supra note 57; Rosenberger, supra note 16.
146
See Hayner, supra note 13, at 600-04 (offering a comparative study of fifteen different
truth commissions).
147
Anthony Lewis, At Home Abroad; Truth andHealing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995, at A17.
148
id
149
BROOKS, supra note 133, at 147.
144

145

150
151

Id.

See Lewis, supra note 147.
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unique occurrence so soon after the ending of the South African Apartheid
regime. 152
These essential elements-an opportunity to be heard, a redress for
past wrongs, and state recognition and sanction of the redress-seem to provide
suggestions as a way forward to considerinf how to address the left-over
wrongs of the era of dejure White Supremacy.
This conversation has never happened on the institutional level in the
United States. Indeed, the legacy left by the end of the slavery era was one of
renewed American Apartheid through Jim Crow and then eventually the
changes brought about by the political and legal Civil Rights Movement of the
1950s and 1960s. At least one unintended consequence of this movement of
change and evolution was the fact that conversations about the legacy of
slavery and the government's responsibility for that legacy have remained at
the level of abstract policy. The government has not engaged in a dialogue
about the lived history of slavery and its enduring legacy. This dialoguewhich is not about monetary reparations, but about creating awareness and
seeing the past, and eventually the present, as it is-seems essential in order to
create progress in the ongoing confrontation of the legacy of racism.154 It
provides an opportunity to reframe not only our history, but also our modern
debates concerning race. If we can consider anew the indignity of slavery,
segregation, and second-class status perpetrated by systems and individuals in
our tortured legacy around race, we can understand the discourse that surrounds
affirmative action, immigration, and even reparations in a different way.
Moreover, beyond the societal and collective potential that a Truth and
Reconciliation type discussion would allow, this approach provides a real
opportunity for validation and transformation on the individual and community

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was unique in that it provided
for a fragile transition to a stable government. Brooks acknowledges that without offering
amnesty to apartheid perpetrators, racial reconciliation and democratic government would not
have been successful. BROOKS, supra note 133, at 147.
153
See Hayner, supra note 13, at 600-04 where she describes the objectives of a truth
commission as follows:
[F]irst, a truth commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is
not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of
certain human rights abuses, or violations of international humanitarian law,
over a period of time. Third, a truth commission usually exists temporarily
and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the submission of a
report of its findings. Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some
sort of authority, by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access to
information, greater security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a
greater impact with its report.
152

Id.
"Apologies offer accountability, a 'reality check' allowing society to admit the harm and
set the record straight.... [a]pologies can be particularly valuable when they address previously
unrecognized harms." Wenger, supra note 133, at 5.
154
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level.155 The descendants of the Polley children through their own reflections
have spoken to the psychic benefit that the court's declaration provided. For
example, in reflecting on the import of the trial, Theresa Polley Shellcroft said,
"I am struck by the overwhelming emotions of this entire event ... [t]o go from
not knowing who you are-or your roots-to knowing your family history with
court records to document that history, to witnessing the decision that began
160 years ago about whether your ancestors were legally free or slaves is
overwhelming."1 56 James Hale also reflected on the momentous nature of the
trial: "[T]his is a legacy for our family that future generations can talk about
15 7 . .
[m]y grandchildren can say, 'I sat in the courtroom as part of the story."'
These quotes suggest that for the descendants of the Polley children,
the declaration validated what they believed about themselves and their
ancestors and transformed the narrative of kidnapping and enslavement to one
of freedom. Moreover, for the audience in attendance at the trial, those who
read the newspaper accounts and even now as you the reader consider this
Essay, this truth telling provides an opportunity for us to consider concretely
the history of slavery and transform our own views about it. And yet, as I
reflect on this, I am aware of the fact that this specific factual scenario would
be difficult to implement en masse. As Shellcroft explained, "[Tlhere are not
many people, period, in the world who can find their family history
documented. It's overwhelming. It's knowing who you are and where you
came from. For many African-Americans that's not possible." 58
Yet, through using the power of the state to provide space to allow
voices that were silenced to speak their truth about their indignities, it is
possible that the larger validation and awareness can take place. Perhaps the
Polley case represents a way to rethink the historical trap of forgetfulness and
continually defining our world by the legacy of White Supremacy. The
adjudication completed history, validated the Polley descendants views about
their ancestors and themselves, and raised the consciousness of those involved
and those who watched it.

1
Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Refraining Redress: A "Social Healing
Through Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation
Initiatives, 16 AsLN AM. L.J. 5, 18-24 (2009) (proposing that many democracies have placed
reconciliation, with regards to slavery and other historical injustices, high on their political
agendas given the growing "emphasis on the individual and societal benefits of storytelling,
apologies, symbolic payments, and public education").
156
Crigler, supra note 57.
1
Rosenberger, supra note 16.

158

Crigler, supranote 57.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Polley case represents an amazing history and a conscious decision
by the State through the Circuit Court of Wayne County, West Virginia, to
bring that history to light for both the Polley descendants and for the residents
of Wayne County to name the Polley children as free persons and to educate
the broader community. This choice was to use the court as a space where the
truth about the Polley children could be told. Its ends included the
transformation of the descendants of the Polley children and the opportunity to
make real and present the legacy of slavery, which continues to define the
United States and its ongoing struggles concerning race.
In the end, the Polley adjudication suggests that the power of truth
telling is an important interest that the government could pursue as a means to
take responsibility for the history of slavery, a history the government itself
helped to perpetuate. Moreover, such truth telling can go towards healing the
harms of slavery on a personal and societal level. In this sense, there is more to
be done than to stop discriminating on the basis of race. The wounds that racial
discrimination has inflicted (and continues to inflict) should be brought to light
so that healing on all sides can actually take place. The Polley adjudication
serves as a pointer towards this approach. It is up to future work to develop it
into something more.
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